real world examples and academic theory to assess the sanctions used by regulators with regard to the impact these sanctions have on the behaviour and mentality of bank directors.
Comparisons are drawn between the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US) approaches to the issue, as well as other relevant jurisdictions and international initiatives.
These two jurisdictions have been selected due to their similar legal systems and comparable global status in the banking sector, but the two are not entirely the same and differences are observed in their approaches to enforcement. Additionally, trends may be appearing in the 1 Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report: Recommendations (Domarn Group 2011). 2 Financial Services Act 2012 c.21. 3 Fred Goodwin's pension has been of keen media interest, having retired, it has been reduced significantly since he retired but it is still in the hundreds of thousands per year: BBC News, 'Former RBS Boss Fred Goodwin Stripped of Knighthood' <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16821650> accessed 12 November 2013. 4 Serious Fraud Office, 'Trader Charged in LIBOR Investigation' <http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latestpress-releases/press-releases-2013/trader-charged-in-libor-investigation.aspx> accessed 10 November 2013. effectiveness of these financial sanctions is assessed; in terms of their impact upon the banks and whether such penalties hold directors to account. This part of the chapter demonstrates the relative insignificance of the financial sanctions when compared to bank profits and questions whether financial sanctions achieve the objectives intended. When a bank receives a financial sanction, it is usually directly related to a specific wrongdoing, it is a punishment for a specific penalties the FSA imposed in 2012; the contrast is most clearly seen when comparing the respective financial sanctions for the same offences. The most prominent example of UK and US authorities imposing financial sanctions for the same offence is in relation to the LIBOR scandal. 37 The LIBOR scandal warrants special attention as it provides a unique opportunity to directly compare the financial sanctions imposed by the UK and US authorities. This rare occurrence may be analysed over three instances as both UK and US authorities have fined three banks. Prior to assessing the financial sanctions, the LIBOR scandal must first be explained.
LIBOR is an acronym, it refers to the London Interbank Offered Rate, this in turn refers to a set of 150 interest rates, and these are broken down into 10 currencies each with rates for 15 45 ibid at para 13. 46 FSA, 'Final Notice: Barclays PLC' <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/barclays-jun12.pdf> accessed 03 April 2013 at para 14. 47 ibid at para 14. 48 ibid. 49 useful to look at the profits banks generate, money made is the clearest indicator of how a bank is performing, so negatively impacting upon this with a financial sanction should be an effective method of punishing such an organisation. It is hard to consider the financial sanctions imposed on Barclays as painful when they appear insignificant in relation to the profits the bank generates. To further put the financial sanctions in perspective; the combined financial sanctions equated to £290,692,000, based on the Barclays' 2012 profits this could be earned in just over 2 weeks. 65 It is difficult to argue that this hurts the bank in any significant way. selling of PPI to customers on their loans, without their knowledge or consent, or to customers who were not eligible for the insurance. 107 Since the initial financial sanctions for the banks and insurance brokers customers have been able to claim back the money they paid for PPI, reaching over £8.5 billion in January 2013. 108 Where it is possible to impose a financial sanction directly linked to the wrongdoing, a punishment can potentially be the most effective sanction; the transgression is addressed and a pain in inflicted. 109 Unfortunately not all transgressions have finite consequences and as such correcting the perceived wrong is not always possible. In the US disgorgement orders are imposed on those found guilty of financial crimes, these used to order offenders to repay the money they illegally obtained. 110 These are not used in the UK but should be considered as mechanism to separate the punishment element of the financial sanction from the 'compensating the mischief' 111 element. Financial sanctions do not appear to inflict a pain on banks, they clearly cause them some loss but the loss is insignificant and so cannot be considered painful.
Comparing the UK and US
The obvious response to this would be to suggest the authorities in the UK and the US impose higher financial sanctions, but this would risk two things; removing proportionality and causing further resentment against the regulators, reducing compliance. In relation to proportionality, the financial sanctions must be related to the wrongdoing; it would be unjust to impose a £1billion financial sanction for a transgression valued at £1,000 in the pursuit of inflicting pain on a bank. would have accounted for 15% of that desk's profits. 127 Further to this should the regulators seek to punish those accountable rather than the bank as a whole? As a bank absorbs a financial sanction as a company it will pass this on to shareholders through reduced dividends, yet the directors in control of the bank remain unaffected. The potential for punishments aimed at increasing accountability need to be explored; a sanction directly impacting upon the directors would be the disqualification of individuals.
Director Disqualification
This part of the chapter considers the use of disqualification as an enforcement measure, removing those responsible from a bank in order to prevent future wrongdoing. This is potentially more effective as it prevents re-offending and targets those who are responsible for the actions of the bank, rather than punishing the entire bank, with the financial sanction being paid out of the bank's profits, which impacts on shareholders dividends. disqualification does exist but has limited scope; automatic disqualification arises when an individual becomes bankrupt. In this situation disqualification is automatic and will last as long as he or she is bankrupt. All other instances of disqualification will involve intervention by the courts or a regulator.
Powers of UK Regulators to Disqualify
The FCA and the PRA have the power to make a prohibition order, "if it appears… that an individual is not a fit and proper person," 146 to perform functions carried out by an authorised person. The length of this prohibition order may be permanent, but can also be varied or revoked by the regulator if they are satisfied the individual is not fit and proper. 147 Both regulators also have a similar power in withdrawing approval, stipulated in s.63 of FSMA
2000
. 148 The FCA and PRA must consult each other before this power is exercised, it is not stated whether an individual may reapply, but it is likely that they will be at a disadvantage in passing the relevant checks to become an approved person in the future, as the individual and the company will be obliged to disclose the withdrawal. 149 Statistics detailing the use of this power by the FSA and FCA are unavailable; a freedom of information request was made but the FCA advised that there would be a fee required for this information. 150 The CDDA 86 applies to any company director and so should be considered as a potential tool in holding bank directors accountable. Some sections of the 1986 Act are dependent on the bank being insolvent, which for many banks was avoided due to government bail outs. 151 The term 'unfit' will be assessed in relation the CDDA 86, exploring when a director is deemed to be unfit, as this may prove a useful mechanism to hold directors to account. Additionally the potential for This set of duties is drafted so widely that a director is likely to breach one duty when fulfilling another; as a result it could be argued any director may be disqualified for breaching these duties if the law was applied strictly. A slightly narrower duty is found in the s. 209 The use of disqualification appears limited; to a modest proportion in the US and to the most serious cases in the UK; usually where the bank has entered liquidation. 210 The emphasis in the UK seems to be placed on the state of the company; while it is a going concern, even if only because of a government bailout, the directors are largely assumed to be fit and proper. The majority of disqualification orders are issued only when the company becomes insolvent. 211 This trend is protecting the majority of bank directors from facing disqualification, as their banks have been saved from insolvency through government bailouts. Strangely the bailouts appear to be an intervening act, preventing the directors from having caused the required damages.
It is not clear whether the UK rules regarding disqualification will be amended to utilise this tool and hold those responsible to account. Where directors are saved from the impact of financial sanctions by the companies they preside over, they have been saved from disqualification by a government too afraid to allow those companies to fail. Disqualification is still a civil law measure and appears to be underused; the next consideration is the role criminal law may have to play in holding directors to account. take a decision, which changes the way the business is carried on, and subsequently the bank fails. 215 This offence may be too vague and it may still be too difficult to obtain a conviction, it is unlikely that one decision will be identified which can be attributed to the failure of a bank.
The second question may then be answered by comparing the convictions and subsequent prison sentences imposed in the UK and the US. As Andrew Tyrie surmises; there have been no convictions relating to the financial crisis, but other convictions will be used to identify the policy in the UK. 216 The US sentencing policy will also be considered and finally the concluding remarks will highlight the impacts on bank directors. 
Reckless Risk-Taking
In the wake of the financial crisis it has been claimed that bank directors did not understand the risks they were taking, which Fisher et al, argue is clearly reckless. Using RBS as an example; Johnny Cameron, former RBS director, admitted he did not fully understand the risks of derivative trading. 236 is proved that there was the taking of a risk which there was no right to take which would cause detriment or prejudice to another." 239 The reckless risk-taking offence would follow that an offence is committed if there was insufficient knowledge to take the risk; it would also be apply where the risk was known. The introduction of such a new offence would suffer from a similar issue to that of the LIBOR offence, it cannot be applied retrospectively. As a result those who have no doubt committed reckless risk-taking cannot be convicted, because it was not an offence at the time they committed it. Additionally the offence suggested, will still potentially only affect low level staff, as the proposed Fisher et al would apply, "where a person recklessly bought or sold a financial instrument on a recognised financial exchange," and they did not understand that product. This may still be too closely linked to the actions carried out bank staff other than directors; board members rarely purchase the financial instruments, traders will do this instead. The offence is not without merit though; it could be reworded so that directors should understand the liabilities involved in the products they buy. This may provide a realistic threat of criminal liability for bank directors. Such a rewording may be;
Where a person recklessly purchased or sold, or oversaw the purchase or sale of, a financial instrument on a recognised financial exchange and did not understand the product, or understood but still took the risk.
This working would expand the offence to be applicable to directors. Not all commentators agree that bankers should go to prison for their wrongdoing; Goplan argues the individuals should face prohibition orders and non-custodial sentences, subsequently they can then contribute to society in other industries; 240 enabling them to pay back their debts to society which they cannot do from jail. While this argument may have value to it, banned bankers may be able to repay their social debt through working in other industries, it is difficult to quantify this debt and such measures do not serve as punishment. Additionally it is difficult to see how it is 'just' for one class of criminal to avoid prison while another does not, save the existing scale where sentences are linked to the severity of the crime. Goplan's ideas come from earlier work by Becker on the pros and cons of prison against the purposes and benefits of criminal law. 241 Becker and Goplan argue that different individuals are affected more by prison sentences; for example an unemployed man convicted of theft will lose his freedom, whereas a banker convicted of theft will lose his job, his freedom and the likelihood of obtaining a future job to the level he previously had. Goplan thus argues that merely the criminal conviction will serve as punishment to the banker as he will lose his job and damage his future employability, the unemployed man has no job to lose so can only be punished with a prison sentence. This argument may split opinion; while it may be accepted by some, others will argue that all people should be treated equally under the law and thus face the same punishments. In the case of bank directors it is difficult to view losing their position as adequate punishment as they may still retire on sizable pensions 242 and assets already acquired.
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Has the UK Legal System Failed?
As stated above, no bank director has been put in prison for their role in 2007 financial crisis; this chapter argues that this is not evidence in itself that the UK legal system has failed. Andrew 
Alternative measures
It has been seen in the previous parts of this chapter that the sanctions currently preferred by regulators have little impact upon bank directors, such as with financial sanctions, or are not directly applicable to their wrongdoing, such as criminal charges and prison sentences. With this in mind, this part of the chapter highlights some alternative punishments, aimed at directly impacting on bank directors by holding them to account for their actions. Revoking a bank's licence to undertake regulated activities has been raised as a potential punishment for wrongdoing;
273 this would essentially force the closure of a bank as it would be unable to continue to operate. As with financial sanctions, this is a punishment on the entire bank, not just the directors, but it will have a direct impact on them as it will most likely cause the bank to cease operations. This step arguably punishes a lot of innocent individuals, who will lose their jobs as a result; not only those employed by the bank will suffer, millions of deposits would be affected and any individual or firm contractually linked with the bank may be exposed. 274 Considering the ramifications of such action, it may not be viable sanction in order to punish individuals. While licence revocations remain unlikely, media reports suggested it was used as a threat by the FSA in an attempt to force banks to comply with bonus caps. 275 The threat of such action can have damaging consequences on banks, as can be seen in the wake of Secondly the bank's licence was revoked because it was in financial difficulty; it was not used as a punishment.
The issue with licence revocation is that it is potentially the strongest measure a regulator can take against an institution; it is difficult to justify such a measure. cases. The issue the highlighted by Ayres and Braithwaite's theory is that there may be gaps in the sanction regime; it may be that no sanctions are politically acceptable to impose for an offence. As a result a sanction may either be too weak or unjustifiably strong. Ayres and Braithwaite suggest than a sanctions regime may have not measures applicable for certain offences as a lesser sanction may be too weak but the next sanction available may be too strong.
Some sanctions have variable severity; financial sanctions for example may be of greater or lesser severity depending on the size of the financial sanction; but as has been explored above, the effectiveness of this punishment is questionable. Prison sentences may also be considered as a sanction as severe as possible, this may too only be applied in the most serious cases.
Licence revocation is an unlikely punishment for large banks; the size of these companies, and the share of the market they hold, has made them 'too big to fail', or too big to be allowed to fail for fear of the impact it would have. 283 'Too big to fail' status is subjective, dependent on the institution's size, the size of the economy it is in, or country it is based, and its market share. 284 The label 'too big to fail' is not publically given to a company and arguably is only explicitly clear when the institution is bailed out by the government. It can often be gauged beforehand, and this is seen to increase the risk such firms will take in the knowledge they will be saved by the government should they get into trouble. 285 It is very unlikely that a bank which is considered 'too big to fail' is going to have its licence revoked and essentially be made to fail; it would also appear unjust to punish so many individuals for the actions of a few. The concept of limited liability protects the members of a company from liability for the debts of a company; the company is considered a legal person and may acquire its own assets and be liable for its own debts. 286 This principle stretches to the employees of that company, they are not personally liable for the debts of the company; the company is liable as a legal person. 287 There are exceptions to this principle, in certain circumstances, under the Insolvency Act Cable's language is typically broad; strong words such as "tough measures to beef up the system" 293 appear well in the press but give no detail of the wording of legislation, so are largely irrelevant. Proposing personal liability for directors provokes contrasting responses; some suggest it will "focus bank directors' minds;" 294 while, perhaps unsurprisingly, the Institute of Directors argue the personal liability would be counter-productive, impeding the work of company directors. 295 The proposals may still be inapplicable to many bank directors, as they will only be liable upon the failure of the company, which is unlikely in the case of a large enough bank, considered 'too big to fail'. The US have sought to impose liability upon banks directors through the Dodd Frank Act, 296 worryingly, there appears to already be advice for 303 The SEC imposed financial sanctions in December 2012 which equated to over 3 times the total value of financial sanctions imposed by the FSA during the whole year, and on average the SEC will fine an individual over 5 and a half times the amount the FSA would. This situation is similar to the comparison of company financial sanctions between the two countries; a clear difference in approach can be seen, the US regulators will regularly impose much higher penalties than the UK. What is not known from these statistics is the impact this has upon the directors. It can be surmised that a director will face a much higher financial sanction if he or she were in the US than the UK; 
Conclusion
This chapter has explored a number of sanctions and their applicability to bank directors. profits. 306 The insignificance of the financial sanctions in relation to bank profits support the suggestion that they do not serve as a credible deterrence; an argument which is further supported by the repeated offences of UBS in relation to their inadequate risk management systems. 307 It would perhaps be more appropriate to impose the sanction on the part of the bank which offends. Should the £160 million financial sanction against UBS have been applied to the desk responsible, it would have accounted for 15% of that desk's profits. 308 UK and US approaches to financial sanctions show a clear difference in policy; the US imposes much higher sanctions on a regular basis. While this shows a stronger approach, the effectiveness of financial sanctions still appears limited. Banks can still absorb these financial sanctions, and the continual stream of settlements suggests they are not serving as a deterrence, and only in limited circumstances may they correct the damage caused. The comparison between the US and the UK suggests increasing the financial sanctions is not the answer; the US imposes higher fines but faces the same persisting issues. It is suggested that the UK adopts the US policy of imposing clear disgorgement orders to clearly indicate the functions each part of the financial sanction is intended to achieve. As financial sanctions do not appear to hold directors to account, disqualification may do, but unfortunately this tool appears to be underused. This big to fail' is still pertinent, and has now effectively been made public on a global scale by the Financial Stability Board's list of 'Global Systemically Important Banks'. 315 Personal financial sanctions and personal liability are also considered unlikely despite their merits as considered within part 5. Personal liability of directors was seen to apply in a similar fashion to the laws relating to director disqualification, relying upon the bank to be insolvent. 316 Proposals for the circumstances leading to personal liability to be widened received support from various sources, 317 but were opposed by the Institute of Directors who argued that personal liability would be counter-productive. 318 The proposals did not go far enough; failure of the company was still required, which is unlikely in the case of a large enough bank, considered 'too big to fail'. Personal financial sanctions are found to be underused in the UK, especially in comparison to the US; the comparison shows a similar pattern to that seen when assessing financial sanctions on the whole bank. US fines are much higher than those in the UK. It can also be seen that the US authorities use this sanction more frequently than the UK.
Comparing the UK to the approach of the US, a clear theme is present. The UK imposes far smaller financial sanctions, far shorter prison sentences and it also appears to be less varied in the sanctions is imposes. In the defence of the UK, it could be argued that the UK is much smaller than the US, so will impose fewer sanctions. While this is true the size of the sanctions should be comparable, especially when they are imposed for the same offence, such as in the LIBOR cases. The variety in sanctions in important as it increases the deterrence effect of the sanctions, "[T]he bigger and more various are the sticks, the greater the success regulators will achieve by speaking softly." 319 The UK authorities have arguably become too predictable, so the effect of the deterrence is diminished. Banks may expect a financial sanction and can accept that sanction; as shown through the analysis in part 2. The UK regime lacks the variety to cover offences of all severity. It should utilise director disqualification and personal financial sanctions in order to fill in the gaps in the regime. Financial sanctions may be appropriate for offence B but do not address the other offences, in cases where offence D has been committed the director should be held accountable and disqualification would be appropriate.
The issue of bank director accountability is arguably exacerbated by the issue of 'too big to fail', as directors know their banks will not fail, they will not face personal liability and they will not be disqualified. This is the precedent shown in the major banks in the wake of the financial crisis; Fred Goodwin was not held accountable after leaving RBS when their losses became apparent, and although James Crosby has lost his knighthood, he has not been 
